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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending September 2 1972

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



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Enemy Activity

Fighting was sporadic throughout South Vietnam during the week with the heaviest activity again occurring in Military Region (MR) 1. South Vietnamese forces continued their persistent attempts to expand their perimeter in and near Quang Tri City in the face of heavy artillery fire. At the same time, Communist forces south of Danang and in northern Quang Tin Province increased their pressure on ARVN units whose forward progress has largely been stopped since their recapture of Que Son district town. In the western highlands, the Communists continued to deploy to forward positions in Pleiku Province, and over the weekend, captured the Plei Djereng Ranger Camp. Enemy activity in the southern half of South Vietnam was characterized by scattered attacks by fire, harassing actions against important supply routes, and the repositioning of enemy units. The NVA 7th and the VC 9th Divisions continued to operate north and west of Saigon -- interdicting Route 13 and resisting Allied operations north of An Loc. Although Allied ground actions and air strikes have inflicted heavy losses on Communist troops and forced them deeper into Base Area 470 in the northern Delta, the enemy continues to prepare for offensive action. Elements of the Phuoc Long Front (formerly the NVA 1st Division) now appear to be on the move from Cambodia into the western Delta, and captured documents, prisoner and agent reports, and communications intelligence point to an imminent increase in enemy activity, particularly in Kien Giang and Chau Doc Provinces.

In Laos, General Vang Pao's Operation PHOU PHIANG suffered its second major setback in as many weeks as the enemy attacked and dispersed one of the irregular task forces to the north of the Plaine des Jarres on 29-30 August. The North Vietnamese effectively employed heavy artillery and mortar attacks with follow-up ground assaults to force the irregulars to withdraw. Friendly losses are as yet unknown. The other task forces of PHOU PHIANG have made little or no progress and in some instances have lost ground. Bad weather during the week has severely hampered both tactical air and resupply efforts, and tactical air support has been further inhibited by competing requirements for U.S. air resources elsewhere in Indochina. Vang Pao has been very despondent and concerned at what he regards as lack of promised air support. Recent cable exchanges, plus General Vogt's Labor Day weekend visit to Laos appear to have resolved this problem.

In the Lao Panhandle, enemy activity around Khong Sedone has been limited to small clashes and attacks by fire, and civilian activity in the town has more or less returned to normal with both the civilian government and public services again in place and functioning. East of Pakse, North Vietnamese forces attempted to surround an irregular battalion deployed along Route 23 early in the week. The insertion of reinforcements into the area and effective air support relieved the enemy pressure, and at week's end government troops were still in control of the Route 23/231 road junction.

Military activity in Cambodia was at a moderate level as the Communists continued their efforts to interdict key lines of communication. The main action of the week was along Route 5, and the Communists now control a large segment of this road after ousting FANK units from Ponley, 20 miles northwest of Kompong Chhnang City. Government forces, however, are preparing to launch counter-operations in an effort to clear this vital link to the rice producing areas of Battambang Province. A section of Route 6, between Sisophon and Siem Reap, also remains closed as a result of earlier enemy action, but Communist forces have been cleared from the area and FANK is in the process of repairing the road. Other government troops have initiated clearing operations along Route 2 south of Phnom Penh toward Takeo, and south of Takeo Route 2 has been cleared by friendly local forces. The Communists continue harassing activity against Route 1 between Neak Luong and Kompong Trabek, but the road remains open.

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Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

This week, 1,030 new NVA personnel were detected on their way from North Vietnam to the Quang Tri-Thua Thien front. The estimated total number of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971, however, rose by some 10,000 to a new total of 150,300 - 152,300 -- because of the acceptance of 18 "gap fill" groups containing about 9,000 personnel who had departed earlier this spring and summer. Intercepted communications and the North Vietnamese media indicate that Hanoi has embarked on its third military conscription drive this year. The troops inducted during the current drive will probably be ready to enter the infiltration pipeline by the beginning of the next dry season this October.

The Communists have also been active on the logistics front. Photography of 27 August revealed over 110 canvas-covered armored vehicles on flat cars and some 380 trucks and 375 pieces of rolling stock at Pinghsiang, China, near the North Vietnamese border. Additionally, two of the three petroleum pipelines from China to North Vietnam now appear to be operational with the third rapidly nearing completion. By 30 July, 12 pumping stations had been identified between Dong Dang and Hai Duong, and a bomb-damaged storage area near Kep had been by-passed.

In the southern part of North Vietnam, intercepted messages and aerial observation continue to indicate the large-scale movement of supplies southward into South Vietnam. A recent intercept from Quang Tri stated that 3,500 tons of supplies had been distributed there by a major logistic unit. This figure, which is probably a monthly summary, indicates a daily delivery rate of over 100 tons -- substantially higher than daily requirements -- and suggests stockpiling for the future. (Monsoon rains beginning next month will severely hinder supply efforts in this area.) Despite these high deliveries, good evidence indicates that distribution problems in forward areas and Allied preemptive operations are causing supply shortages for some enemy units in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

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